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A Primer on Demand Response and a Critique of FERC Order 745 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.1
 
 
 The debate about demand response in electricity markets has become far more 
complicated than it needs to be. The basic economic and legal concepts implicated by the 
debate are simple. They are, or should be, much easier to understand than the tens of 
thousands of pages of contentious testimony and comments submitted in Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) and state public utility commission (PUC) demand 
response proceedings suggest.  My goal is to describe the applicable economic and legal 
principles in a manner that will make the debate broadly accessible to market 
participants, policy makers, and the general public. 
A. The Economics of Demand Response 
 The price of any good or service sold in a competitive market is determined by 
the intersection of the supply and demand curves.2 The supply curve is determined by the 
marginal cost (MC) of the good or service.3 MC is the cost of the last unit of the good or 
service produced.4 For purposes of understanding the demand response debate, it may be 
easiest to think of MC with reference to an alternative but functionally identical 
definition. MC is the cost society saves by declining to produce the last unit of the good 
or service.5
 In a competitive market, we can rely on market forces alone to yield an 
appropriate demand response to changes in conditions of supply or demand.
  
6
                                                 
1 Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University.  
 If the MC-
2 For a good description of the determinants of the performance of a competitive market, see Joel Dirlam & 
Alfred Kahn, Fair Competition Policy: the Law and Economics of Antitrust Policy 29-42 (1954). 
3 Richard Pierce & Ernest Gellhorn, Regulated Industries 26-38 (4th ed. 1999); Alfred Kahn, I The 
Economics of Regulation 63-87 (1970) .  
4 I Kahn, note 3, supra., at 65-70.  
5 Id. at 65-66.  
6 Id. at 66-67. 
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based price a customer confronts exceeds the value the customer places on the last unit 
the customer purchases, the customer will decline to purchase that unit. If we have taken 
the steps needed to equate marginal social cost (MSC) with marginal private cost (MPC), 
each customer’s decision to purchase or not to purchase a unit maximizes social welfare, 
since each customer is basing its purchase decisions on its application of a social cost-
benefit test that it is uniquely well-equipped to apply.7
For present purposes, I will assume that the MSC of making a unit of electricity 
available on a wholesale or retail market equals the MPC of that process. I will relax that 
assumption in section D. On that assumption, the customer receives the socially-optimal 
“reward” for declining to purchase any unit with a benefit that falls short of its MC-based 
price—a reward equal to the cost society avoids as a result of the customer’s decision not 
to purchase a unit that it values less than the MC-based price of the unit. This is why we 
do not need to devise a system to “reward” customers for engaging in demand response 
in most markets. The savings the customer realizes as a result of its decision not to 
purchase a unit of a good or service is a “reward” for conservation that is precisely equal 
to the social value of that decision to conserve. 
  
 Many electricity markets do not replicate the performance of competitive markets, 
however, for two reasons. First, some of the functions that must be performed to deliver 
electricity to customers—mainly transmission and distribution—involve economies of 
scale so large that the owners of the assets that perform those functions have monopoly 
power.8 When a producer has monopoly power, the prices it charges exceed MC.9
                                                 
7 Id. at 69. 
 In the 
8 Richard Pierce, A Proposal to Deregulate the Market for Bulk Power, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1183, 1209-11 
(1986). 
9 II Kahn, supra. note 3, at 113-23.  
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absence of government intervention of some type, that effect of monopoly power would, 
inter alia, reduce social value by inducing consumers to engage in too much conservation. 
       The existence of monopoly power both eliminates the natural tendency of a 
competitive market to induce optimal conservation and justifies government regulation. 
The US has long regulated both the wholesale and retail price of electricity. The 
existence of price regulation is the second reason why we can not be confident that 
electricity markets alone will yield optimal demand response. The methods we use to 
regulate the price of electricity often yield prices that diverge significantly from MC.10
 The divergence between MC-based prices and regulated prices, and the resulting 
failure to provide adequate incentives for demand response, can have serious adverse 
effects. The best single illustration of the potential adverse effects of that divergence is 
the California energy debacle of 2000.
 In 
some important contexts, regulated prices fall well short of MC. That creates a situation 
in which consumers have incentives to conserve too little in the absence of some other 
form of government intervention that offsets that incentive effect—e.g., an explicit 
“reward” for conservation in addition to the market-based “reward” the consumer gets as 
a result of a decision to decline to purchase a unit of electricity. 
11 During the spring of 2000, California 
experienced periodic blackouts and a 500 per cent increase in the wholesale price of 
electricity.12
                                                 
10 Pierce, supra. note 8, at 1204-05. 
 Those catastrophic events would not have occurred if government officials 
in California had taken account of the critical role of demand response in an electricity 
market. Instead, the California legislature imposed a freeze on the retail price of 
11 See Richard Pierce, How Will the California Debacle Affect Energy Deregulation? 54 Ad. L. Rev. 389 
(2002).   
12 Id. at 389. 
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electricity.13
Without the retail price freeze, California consumers would have experienced the 
price increases that normally flow from a reduction in available supply and would have 
reduced their consumption accordingly. That, in turn, would have produced a new 
equilibrium in the wholesale market. The wholesale market would have cleared at a price 
somewhat higher than the price that existed before the reduction in the supply available in 
the wholesale market but the existence of demand response to the price increase would 
have served as a natural brake on the rate of increase in the retail price. In the absence of 
demand response to the changes in conditions in the wholesale market, the price in that 
market continued to spiral out of control.
 A price freeze eliminates all potential demand responses to a change in 
market conditions. When the supply of electricity in the wholesale market that is the 
source of the electricity that is sold in the California retail market declined, the price in 
the wholesale market increased, but the freeze on the retail price precluded retailers from 
passing that increase through to consumers. As a result, consumers had no incentive to 
reduce their purchases.  
14
The California debacle illustrates an important point that Louis Kaplow has made 
in some of his recent contributions to the antitrust literature. Market share alone can tell 
us nothing about whether a firm has market power, i.e., the power to increase market 
price by reducing the amount of a good or service it supplies.
 Blackouts were the inevitable result of that 
failure to allow a demand response in the retail market to the increases in the price in the 
wholesale market.  
15
                                                 
13 Id. at 395. 
 If the demand for a 
14 Id. at 397. 
15 Louis Kaplow, Market Share Thresholds: On the Conflation of Empirical Assessment and Legal Policy 
Judgments, forthcoming in 7 J. Comp. L. & Econ. (2011); See also Kahn, supra.  .     
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product or service is completely price elastic, even a firm with 100% of the market has no 
market power.16 Conversely, if the demand for a product or service is completely price 
inelastic, even a firm with only 1 per cent of the market can exercise market power.17 The 
retail price freeze imposed by the California legislature created a market with completely 
price inelastic demand. A market with no potential demand response always performs 
poorly.18
The California debacle also illustrates another important point. Both wholesale 
markets and retail markets should be designed to provide appropriate incentives for 
demand response. The failure to provide incentives for any demand response in the 
California retail electricity market had catastrophic results for the wholesale electricity 
market that serves California. It is easy to illustrate the converse of that phenomenon by 
reference to the natural gas market during the 1970s. Below-market ceilings on the price 
of natural gas at the wellhead (the wholesale market) eliminated incentives for purchasers 
to reduce their demand in response to increased prices. That, in turn, produced a variety 
of market distortions and attendant social costs that have been documented in the 
literature, e.g., prices far above market price for supplies that were not subject to 
wholesale price ceilings and shortages in retail gas markets that forced the closure of 
many factories and the layoff of millions of workers.
 The likely effects of failure to provide any incentive to reduce retail demand in 
response to an increase in wholesale price include price spikes, shortages, and extreme 
vulnerability to market manipulation by suppliers in the wholesale market. 
19
                                                 
16 Id. at ___. 
 Thus, it is clear that failure to 
17 Id. at ___. 
18 Pierce, supra. note 11, at 397. 
19 Richard Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas Market, 97 
Harv. L. Rev. 345, 362-65 (1983); Richard Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 
Va. L. Rev. 63, 65-86 (1982).   
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provide appropriate incentives for demand responses to changes in market conditions in a 
wholesale market can have severe adverse effects on any retail market served by that 
wholesale market, while failure to provide incentives for appropriate demand responses 
in a retail market can have severe adverse effects on the performance of the wholesale 
market that serves that retail market. 
B. The Vocabulary of the Demand Response Debate 
Participants in the demand response debate often use three terms that must be 
understood to understand the debate—“locational marginal price,” “real-time pricing,” 
and “negawatts.” Locational marginal price (LMP) is a term that incorporates by 
reference an important characteristic of an electricity market. LMP recognizes that the 
cost of making a unit of electricity available for purchase can vary greatly by location.20 
During some periods of time, the transmission grid is constrained to such an extent that it 
can not support the combination of wholesale transactions that would yield the lowest 
cost supply of electricity to a particular location (or node) on the grid. The size of the 
transmission grid, coupled with the laws of physics, make the determination of LMP at 
any node complicated and dynamic, but it is easy to illustrate the phenomenon by 
assuming a simple grid with only two sources of electricity, 1 and 2, and two nodes, A 
and B, from which retailers purchase electricity.21
                                                 
20 William Hogan, Electric Transmission: A New Model for Old Principles, The Electricity Journal, vol. 6, 
no. 2, p.18 (1993).    
 Assume that the MC of source 1 is 5 
cents, while the MC of source 2 is 10 cents. If there is enough capacity on the grid to 
allow electricity from source 1 to reach node A but not node B, the MC of electricity at 
node A is 5 cents while the MC of electricity at node B is 10 cents. Since price equals 
MC in a competitive market, it follows that the LMP at node A would be 5 cents and the 
21 For a more realistic and more complicated illustration, see id. at 20-22. 
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LMP at node B would be 10 cents in a competitive wholesale market that is supported by 
a transmission grid with those characteristics. Thus, it is useful to refer to LMP as the 
equivalent of MC in a wholesale electricity market. Since the MC of electricity often 
varies significantly by location, we can be confident of getting an appropriate demand 
response to changes in market conditions only if we allow the price of electricity to vary 
by location.  
Real-time pricing is a term that reflects another important characteristic of 
electricity markets. The MC of electricity varies greatly over time.22 That follows from 
three characteristics of the market. First, the marginal cost of generating electricity varies 
greatly among generating units—from about 1 cent per kilowatt hour (KWH) to about 20 
cents per KWH. Second, demand for electricity varies greatly over time—demand at 3 
p.m. on a hot tuesday in august can be many times greater than demand at 3 a.m. on a 
balmy sunday in october. Third, electricity can not be economically stored. It must be 
consumed at the same time it is produced. Thus, it is useful to refer to real-time prices as 
synonymous with electricity prices based on MC. Since the MC of electricity varies 
significantly over time, we can be confident of getting an appropriate demand response to 
changes in market conditions only if we allow prices to vary significantly over time—
real-time pricing.23
                                                 
22 I Kahn supra. note 3, at 89-122. 
 
23 For good descriptions and discussions of real time pricing, see Zhen Zhang, Smart Grid in America and 
Europe, Pub. Util. Fort. vol. 149, no. 1 at p. 46 and no. 2 at p.32 (2011); Steven Andersen, Saving the 
Smart Grid, Pub. Util. Fort. vol. 149, no. 1 at p. 32 (2011); Ashley Brown & Raya Salter, Can Smart Grid 
Technology Fix the Disconnect Between Wholesale and Retail Pricing? Elec. J. vol. 24, no. 1, at p. 7 
(2011).          
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Negawatt is a term that is sometimes used to refer to the economic equivalence of 
a unit of electricity saved and a unit consumed.24 Participants in the demand response 
debate often assert that, since a negawatt is equivalent to a megawatt, it follows that 
someone who produces a negawatt should be rewarded in a manner equivalent to 
someone who produces a megawatt. That is true but the equation of negawatts and 
megawatts is also potentially misleading. Any consumer that forgoes purchase and 
consumption of a unit of electricity should be rewarded in an amount equal to the MC of 
the unit it declines to purchase, but any consumer that purchases electricity in a 
competitive market automatically receives exactly that reward in the form of a reduction 
in its cost of electricity. Thus, for instance, if the MC of a unit of electricity is 8 cents, 
and the consumer declines to purchase a unit at a price of 8 cents, the consumer receives 
a reward of 8 cents. That reward is equal to the cost society avoids as a result of the 
decision not to produce that unit of electricity.25
If the consumer is also rewarded by receiving a price of 8 cents per unit for 
producing a “negawatt,” as some of the participants in the demand response debate urge, 
the consumer is rewarded at a total price equal to twice the MC of the unit of electricity it 
consumes.
  
26
I have long been puzzled by the apparent inability of many smart people to 
understand that compensating some entity for producing a “negawatt” is inappropriate 
 The consumer both saves 8 cents and receives 8 cents.  Thus, a system of 
pricing negawatts as if they are megawatts is premised on a math error that no first grader 
should make. 8 cents plus 8 cents is not 8 cents. 
                                                 
24 For detailed discussion and analysis of negawatt acquisition programs, see Bernard Black & Richard 
Pierce, The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 
Colum. L. Rev. 1339, 1354-84 (1993). 
25 Id. at 1384-89. 
26 For detailed explanation of the double-counting effect, see id. at 1360-61.   
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and involves simple double counting. I suspect that this common error is attributable to 
the tendency of many people to focus only on the cost of electricity. It is certainly true 
that consumption of electricity imposes social costs, but the same is true of any other 
good or service. Consider the market for books, for instance. Books are made primarily 
of paper. Production of paper imposes significant social costs, as anyone who has 
knowledge of timbering and of the pulp and paper business well knows. Yet, an argument 
that we should treat producers of negabooks the same way we treat producers of books 
would not resonate with most audiences. I could not make much money trying to sell 
negabooks by claiming that they have the same value as books. When most people think 
of books, they initially think of their value to society rather than their cost to society. But, 
of course, negawatts also have value. Thus, for instance, I could not create this word file 
on my computer in my nicely lit office if it were not for megawatts.  
Once you recognize that electricity is just like books, or any other product or 
service, it is easy to see why the argument that a negawatt producer should be rewarded 
in the same manner as a megawatt producer makes no sense. Like books, electricity is a 
good that can only be produced and consumed by incurring costs. Our goal in creating a 
properly functioning market for either electricity or books should be to implement a 
pricing system in which price equals MC.27
C. Jurisdictional Complications 
 If we accomplish that goal, a “producer” of 
negawatts or negabooks will be rewarded, in its capacity as a consumer, at an appropriate 
level, in the form of a cost saving equal to the value of the resources not used, every time 
it declines to purchase a unit of electricity or a book. 
                                                 
27 Id. at 1384-89. 
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FERC has jurisdiction over wholesale electricity markets. It has been attempting 
to create competitive wholesale markets for twenty years.28 It has not yet enjoyed 
complete success in that endeavor but it has the ability to address any remaining 
impediments to creation of competitive wholesale markets in every region29 and, it is 
continuing to move in that direction.30 As discussed in section A, a competitive market 
automatically provides appropriate incentives for demand response.31
Retail markets and wholesale markets are closely related in the context of demand 
response, however.
      
32 A retail market that creates inappropriate incentives for demand 
response can have adverse effects on the performance of a wholesale market, and vice 
versa. Unfortunately, the US allocates authority over the wholesale electricity market to 
one entity, FERC, and authority over retail electricity markets to fifty other entities, state 
PUCs. My description of the critical role played by the decision of California authorities 
to impose a retail price freeze in 2000 illustrates the potential for states to make decisions 
applicable to retail markets that have devastating effects on the performance of a FERC-
regulated wholesale market.33
Fortunately, states rarely make decisions at the retail level that have such 
catastrophic effects on the performance of a wholesale market as did the California retail 
rate freeze decision of 2000. States have been reluctant, however, to implement retail 
 
                                                 
28 For discussion of the initial FERC efforts, see Richard Pierce, The State of the Transition to Competitive 
Markets in Natural Gas and Electricity, 15 En. L. J. 323 (1994).    
29 For a discussion of the problems FERC has encountered and the current state of the FERC effort to create  
competitive wholesale markets in each region, see Richard Pierce, Completing the Process of Restructuring 
the Electricity Market, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 451(2005).     
30 In Order 745, FERC recognized the relationship between the competitive wholesale markets it is 
attempting to create and creation of incentives for efficient demand response. FERC Order 745, Docket No. 
RM10-17-000 at p. 9 (Mar. 15, 2011). 
31 Text at notes 2-7 supra. 
32 Text at notes 11-19 supra. 
33 Text at notes 11-14 supra. 
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regulatory regimes that yield optimal incentives for demand response by equating retail 
prices with MC.34 The Department of Energy (DOE) has been urging states to implement 
real-time pricing. One obstacle is the high cost of the smart meters that are a prerequisite 
to implementation of real-time pricing. DOE has attempted to overcome that obstacle by 
providing grants to some states to subsidize programs to install smart meters.35 Even with 
strong encouragement and partial funding from DOE, however, states have resisted 
federal efforts to persuade them to adopt real-time pricing. State consumer advocates and 
PUCs object to real-time pricing based in part of privacy concerns and in part on 
concerns that low income and elderly consumers will pay higher electricity bills as a 
result of their limited ability to shift their consumption from periods in which electricity 
is expensive to periods in which it is inexpensive.36
Real-time pricing would create appropriate incentives for demand response by 
confronting consumers with the reality that electricity costs much more per unit at times 
of peak demand than at times of slack demand. Studies have found that real-time pricing 
can reduce the total cost of electricity by about 12% by inducing consumers to reduce 
their demand at times of peak demand and to increase their demand at times of slack 
demand.
       
37 The resulting reduction in peak demand would allow total demand for 
electricity to be met with less generating capacity and, hence, at lower social cost.38
                                                 
34 The complicated debate with respect to implementation of real time pricing is discussed in detail in the 
sources cited in note 23 supra.    
 Most 
consumers would benefit from real-time pricing because most would switch enough of 
their demand from high-priced periods of peak demand to low-priced periods of slack 
35 DOE, Energy Secretary Chu Announces Five Million Smart Meters Installed Nationwide as Part of Grid 
Modernization Effort (June 13, 2011).   
36 See sources cited in note 23 supra. 
37 Zhen Zhang, supra. note 23. 
38 Id. 
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demand to realize large reductions in their total cost of electricity.39 Unless consumer 
advocates and/or state PUCs change their attitudes, however, retail electricity prices will 
continue to be based on average cost instead of marginal cost.40
FERC has little ability to overcome the unfortunate reluctance of PUCs to adopt 
retail regulatory systems that provide optimum incentives for demand responses to 
changes in market conditions. FERC can, and should, take that reluctance into account in 
choosing and implementing a system of wholesale pricing that incorporates appropriate 
incentives for demand response. The unwillingness of state PUCs to implement real-time 
pricing creates a pricing pattern in which the retail price of electricity is well below MC 
during times of peak demand but in which the retail price exceeds MC at times of slack 
demand. This pattern of prices has the potential to distort the proper functioning of the 
wholesale market in one recurring situation—when a retail customer would be willing to 
reduce its demand if it confronted appropriate incentives but it is not willing to do so 
given the distorted incentives created by the absence of MC-based retail prices. 
    
To illustrate this situation, imagine a large industrial or commercial consumer that 
would reduce its demand during periods of peak demand by 20% if it confronted an MC-
based real-time price of 40 cents per kwh but that is not willing to reduce its demand 
during peak periods at the actual retail price it pays of 8 cents per kwh. Both the retail 
market and the wholesale market would perform better if the consumer could obtain a 
“reward” of 40 cents per kwh, rather than 8 cents per kwh, for reducing its demand by 20 
per cent during periods of peak demand. FERC could address this problem effectively by 
implementing a pricing system in which such a retail customer is “rewarded” at the 
                                                 
39 Brown & Salter, supra. note 23. 
40 Andersen, supra. note 23. 
 13 
wholesale level by receiving a price of 32 cents, the 40 cent MC of the units minus the 
amount of money (8 cents) the customer saves for each unit it declines to purchase during 
periods of peak demand. This method of pricing demand response is often referred to as 
LMP-G, where LMP is the marginal cost of making the unit of electricity available at the 
particular time and place at which the consumer receives delivery and where G is the 
retail price per unit the consumer would pay if it were to purchase the units it is willing to 
forego.41
Note that this mechanism automatically incorporates the high temporal and 
locational variability of the MC of electricity coupled with the unwillingness of most 
PUCs to reflect those variables in retail rates. Thus, for instance, the same consumer 
would not receive any extra “reward” in the form of payments from the wholesale 
market, for reducing its demand during periods of slack demand. During such periods, 
retail rates typically exceed MC. Thus for instance, if MC during a period of slack 
demand is 5 cents, and the customer pays a retail price of 8 cents, it is already being 
overcompensated by 3 cents per unit for reducing its demand during periods of slack 
demand. 
   
D. Complications Caused By Externalities 
In section A, I explained why a competitive market automatically provides 
appropriate incentives for demand response,42 but I added a potentially important 
qualification. A competitive market yields that salutary result only if marginal private 
cost (MPC) equals, or at least approximates, marginal social cost (MSC).43
                                                 
41 FERC Order 745, supra. note 30, at 24.  
 If MSC 
exceeds MPC by a significant amount, a competitive market will provide inadequate 
42 Text at notes 2-7supra.. 
43 Text at note 7 supra. 
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incentives for demand response. MSC exceeds MPC to the extent that there are social 
costs associated with an activity that are not borne by the private market participants that 
engage in the activity.44 Government regulation requires electricity suppliers to 
internalize most of the social costs of generating and transmitting electricity.45
There is one major exception to our use of regulation to require generators to 
internalize the social cost of electricity generation, however. We do not regulate 
effectively emissions of greenhouse gases. If you share my belief in the anthropogenic 
global warming hypothesis, emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) attributable to use of 
hydrocarbons to generate electricity is causing changes in the earth’s climate that have 
the potential for catastrophic effects, including the death of millions of people and the 
dislocation of hundreds of millions of people.
 Thus, for 
instance, electricity generators are required to implement elaborate and expensive 
pollution control technologies to minimize the adverse effects of most of the potential 
pollutants that are byproducts of the generation process. 
46
Electricity generation accounts for 40 per cent of total US emissions of CO2.
 Given present technology, there is no 
way of reducing the emissions of CO2 that are a byproduct of the use of hydrocarbons to 
generate electricity.  
47 
We use hydrocarbons to generate 70 per cent of our total electricity supply.48
                                                 
44 I Kahn supra. note 3, at 193-95.   
 The MSC 
of this part of our electricity supply is well above each generator’s MPC. The most 
effective response to this problem would be to implement a form of government 
45 Black & Pierce, supra. note 24, at 1389-98. 
 
46 Richard Pierce, Energy Independence and Global Warming, 37 Env. Law 595, 597-99 (2007).  
47 EPA, Inventory of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1998-2008, at 2-15 (2010).   
48 DOE, Net Generation by Energy Source: Total (2011).  
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intervention that would require generators to internalize this social cost. Either a well-
designed cap and trade system or a large carbon tax would have that effect.49
It would be very difficult, however, to design and to implement a demand 
response program that would reflect that external cost in an acceptably accurate manner. 
CO2 emissions from generating plants vary from zero for carbon-free generators like 
nuclear power plants to a large number per unit of electricity for coal-powered plants. It 
is hard to imagine how we could incorporate externalities into a demand response 
program given that enormous variation in the magnitude of the externalities. Moreover, 
some consumers might choose methods of reducing their demand for electricity from the 
regulated wholesale electricity market that impose external social costs equal to, or in 
excess of, the external costs of providing electricity from the grid. Thus, for instance, 
some large industrial consumers might choose to use coal to generate their own 
electricity supplies. Any attempt to incorporate recognition of external social costs in a 
 With the 
social costs of climate change internalized to the private market participants that are 
imposing that cost on society, my general assertion that competitive markets 
automatically yield appropriate demand response incentives would continue to apply to 
US electricity markets. So far, however, Congress has declined to adopt either a cap and 
trade system or a carbon tax. In the absence of either of those measures, a competitive 
electricity market will yield inadequate incentives for demand response. Thus, the 
existence of large externalities could, in theory, justify implementing a system for 
rewarding suppliers of demand response, i.e., consumers that reduce the quantity of 
electricity they consume, in an amount in excess of the automatic reward they get in the 
form of reduced electricity bills. 
                                                 
49 Pierce, note 46 supra., at 600-02. 
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demand response programs would have to account for both the high variability of the 
external social costs of electricity obtained from the regulated market and for the 
potential high external social costs of the measures consumers take to reduce their 
purchases from the market. It is not clear that any such system can be designed or 
implemented. 
E. The Applicable Legal Principles 
Any method of attempting to improve on the demand response incentives of 
participants in wholesale electricity markets must be consistent with the requirement in 
the Federal Power Act that all rates must be “just, reasonable, and not unduly 
discriminatory.”50 The just and reasonable standard has existed in a variety of contexts 
for well over a century. Until 1944, courts believed that this statutory language required 
agencies to employ a particular methodology in setting rates.51 That judicial attitude 
changed when the Supreme Court issued its 1944 opinion in Federal Power Commission 
v. Hope Natural Gas Co.52 In that opinion the Court announced that, henceforth, it was 
the “end result” of the ratemaking process, rather than the methodology used, that 
determined the legality of the agency decision. Hope freed agencies to use a variety of 
ratemaking methods, but courts continued to believe that the just and reasonable standard 
had a discrete substantive content that a court could identify and enforce in reviewing 
agency ratemaking decisions. That judicial attitude changed when the Supreme Court 
issued its 1968 opinion in Permian Basin Rate Cases.53
                                                 
50 16 U.S.C. §824d. 
 In that opinion, the Court 
announced that a court must uphold an agency’s decision to authorize particular rates if 
51 Pierce & Gellhorn, note 3 supra., at 83-113. 
52 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
53 390 U.S. 747 (1968). 
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the rates fall within a “zone of reasonableness.” The Hope and Permian Basin decisions 
reflected judicial recognition of some of the realities of the ratemaking process: it is as 
much art as science; both the factual predicates for a ratemaking decision and the effects 
of the rates set are subject to a large range of uncertainty; and, agencies must make 
compromises among competing goals when they set rates.54
After 1968, the tests courts applied in ratemaking cases gradually became a subset 
of the general test courts apply to other agency actions—a court must uphold an agency 
action as long as it is reasonable.
       
55 That general test, in turn, has three components: (1) 
the agency decision must be based on a reasonable interpretation of the applicable 
statute;56 (2) the factual predicates for the agency action must be supported by “such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion;”57 and (3) the agency must provide adequate reasons to explain each of the 
steps it took in its decisionmaking process.58
In the context of ratemaking through application of the just and reasonable 
statutory standard, the first two components of the reasonableness inquiry rarely present a 
problem for an agency. When a court rejects a ratemaking decision it usually does so by 
concluding that the agency action was arbitrary and capricious because of one or more 
flaws or gaps that the court detected in the agency’s reasoning process. Courts reject 
about 30 per cent of agency actions on that basis.
  
59
                                                 
54 See generally Kahn, note 2 supra. 
 Even when a court rejects an agency 
action as arbitrary and capricious, however, about half of the time the court allows the 
55 Richard Pierce, What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean? 63 Admin. L. Rev. 77 
(2011); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 Va. L. Rev. 135 (2010).    
56 Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 842-43 (1984). 
57 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).  
58 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983).   
59 Pierce, supra. note 55, at 83; Zaring, supra. note 55, at 177-78.. 
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agency action to remain in effect in anticipation that the agency will be able to sustain the 
action on remand by correcting any gaps or flaws the court detected in the agency’s 
reasoning process.60
F. FERC Order 745 
 
It is always difficult to predict the results of judicial review of an agency action. 
The duty to provide adequate reasons for a decision is sufficiently malleable to yield 
different results depending on the entering attitudes of the judges who engage in the 
review process.61
In Order 745, FERC rejected the LMP-G method of determining the per unit 
payment a provider of demand response should receive.
 I believe it is likely, however, that a reviewing court will uphold FERC 
Order 745. If I were a member of the circuit court panel that was given responsibility to 
review that Order, I would vote to uphold the action through application of the basic 
principles of law and economics applicable to the ratemaking process. 
62 FERC ordered the Regional 
Transmission Organizations (RTOs) and Independent Service Operators (ISOs) that 
operate each of the regional transmission grids to design and implement a system of 
compensation that has the potential to compensate a provider of demand response at 
LMP.63
                                                 
60 I Richard Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise §7.13 (5th ed. 2010). 
 FERC added an important qualification to that requirement, however. A provider 
of demand response is entitled to receive compensation based on LMP only in 
circumstances in which payment of compensation based on LMP would satisfy a net 
benefits test. FERC instructed RTOs and ISOs to identify the hours in which payment of 
LMP provides net benefits to consumers by determining “when reductions in LMP from 
61 Thomas Miles & Cass Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2008). 
62 FERC Order 745, note 30 supra., at 48. 
63 Id. at 38-39. 
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implementing demand response results in a reduction in the total amount consumers pay 
for resources that is greater than the money spent acquiring those demand response 
resources at LMP.”64 That will be the case only when the unit of generation that is 
avoided as a result of the demand response payment is so much more expensive than the 
cost of the demand response unit that the decrease in LMP multiplied by the remaining 
load would be greater than the cost of the demand response unit.65
If I had been a member of FERC at the time it issued Order 745, I would have 
joined Commissioner Moeller’s dissenting opinion.
 
66 I agree with him that: (1) LMP 
rarely if ever is the correct measure of compensation for a unit of demand response;67 (2) 
LMP-G is the correct measure in most circumstances;68 and, (3) the net benefits test 
requires RTOs and ISOs to make a complicated and burdensome calculation that would 
not be needed if FERC had adopted the LMP-G measure of compensation.69
If I were instead a member of the circuit court panel that is assigned to review 
Order 745, however, I would uphold the Order on the basis that FERC provided 
reasoning adequate to support each step in its decisionmaking process. FERC rejected the 
LMP-G measure of compensation based in part on its belief that it “would result in an 
administrative burden of tracking retail rates for the multiple utilities, ESCOs and power 
authorities and create undue confusion for retail customers and administrative difficulties 
for state commissions and ISOs and RTOs.”
 
70
                                                 
64 Id. at 41. 
 I agree with Commissioner Moeller that 
the process of making the net benefits calculation is likely to be more confusing and 
65 Id. at 42. 
66 Dissenting Opinion of Moeller, Commissioner, in Docket No. RM10-17-000 (Mar. 15, 2011).  
67 Id. at 4, 7, 11. 
68 Id. at 4-5. 
69 Id. at 6. 
70 Id. at 50. 
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burdensome than the process of applying LMP-G, but I can not say that the 
Commission’s contrary belief is unreasonable.  
My strong belief that LMP is almost always the wrong measure to use to 
compensate providers of demand response is tempered by the Commission’s adoption of 
a net benefits test that I suspect will allow for compensation based on LMP only in rare 
cases in which LMP is not much above the appropriate level of compensation. Moreover, 
FERC recognized and addressed explicitly the many ancillary concerns that surround any 
effort to provide compensation for demand response beyond the level provided by the 
market, e.g., it recognized the need to establish a reliable means of calculating and 
verifying the quantity of the demand response claimed by a customer that seeks 
compensation for a demand response.71
Conclusion  
 
I hope that we will reach the point at which there is no justification for adoption 
of any method of compensating demand response through means other than those 
provided automatically by the market for electricity. The conditions needed to reach that 
point are: (1) creation of a competitive wholesale market for electricity in every region; 
(2) implementation of a carbon tax or other means of increasing the price of consumption 
of hydrocarbons to the point at which the MSC of generating electricity approximates the 
MPC of generating electricity; and, (3) adoption of real time MC-based rates in all retail 
markets. Since we are well short of those conditions at present, I believe that FERC 
Order 745 offers the prospect of some marginal improvement in the performance of US 
electricity markets.       
       
                                                 
71 FERC Order 745, note 30 supra., at 71-73. 
